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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Security Officer, CIA

FROM : Assistant Chief, Inspection Division

SUBJECT: Counter Penetration Survey  
(Badge Test)

DATE: 7 December 1951

1. In accordance with oral instruction of the Security Officer, CIA, a test was conducted on 6 December 1951 to determine the possibility of entering a CIA building with an improper badge. The test was made at the guard post at stairway entrance "C-2" on the second floor of "I" Building.
2. Prior to the day of the test all occupants of "I" Building were advised that badges would be closely scrutinized on this day and that some delay might be experienced in passing the guard during the rush periods. The Chief, Physical Security Branch notified the Captain of the Guards, and the guard and his relief at the station concerned were alerted. A representative of Physical Security was on duty at the guard post throughout the day.
3. Also prior to the test, a survey was made of the lost badge records and procedures in the Physical Security Branch which disclosed the following:
  - a. There are six types of admittance badges used, none of which identify CIA.
  - b. A record of lost badges shows a total of [REDACTED] lost badges reported since October 1947, with a recovery of [REDACTED]. There are outstanding at this date [REDACTED] lost badges.
  - c. There is no procedure now in effect to notify the guard force of the identifying numbers of lost badges. New badges are issued to replace those lost after a lapse of 14 days.
4. The following observations were made during the badge test:
  - a. The guard inspected all badges, but did not in all cases ask for their removal from cases, wallets or other containers, and did not in all cases hold the badge in his own hands.
  - b. The principal guard on duty from 8:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. was Charles [REDACTED] who knows practically every person in "I" Building by name. He stated that the procedure which he followed during the test was feasible and not too burdensome and he believed it to be worthwhile. A guard not so well acquainted with the personnel would probably find the task harder and would probably be easier to penetrate. Also, a test at a busier entrance such as at "L" Building would probably present greater difficulties. A relief guard, [REDACTED] was on duty during the noon hour, and the night guard, [REDACTED] went on duty at 3:30 p.m.

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- c. The rush period occurred between 8:20 and 8:30, during which the maximum number of persons in line was 18. The maximum time in line for any one person was 40 seconds. The period at 5:00 a.m. would probably have exceeded the morning rush period except that the guard did not inspect the badges of outgoing persons at that time as carefully as was done during the morning rush period.
- d. Persons going out during the incoming morning rush, and visitors coming in at that time created a minor problem for the guard and stopped the steady in-flow of persons momentarily. Location of the reception office at this guard station contributes to this problem and to insecurity.
- e. Guard [REDACTED] detected the following improper or defective badges during this test which were not part of the penetration plan:
  - (1) Three damaged badges;
  - (2) Nine individuals wearing glasses with photos not showing glasses;
  - (3) One individual wearing moustache; photo clean shaven.

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5. The following planned penetration tests were made:

- a. At 8:25 a.m. an individual, with whom the guard was not acquainted, attempted to pass with an expired temporary badge and was detected.
- b. At 8:30 a.m. an individual known to the guard attempted to pass with a badge of another individual also known to the guard and was detected. The resemblance of the two individuals was generally similar but not enough to cause mistaken identity. (Exhibit A).
- c. At 10:30 a.m. an individual using the badge of her twin sister attempted to pass. She was detained momentarily for wearing glasses not shown on photo, but was passed after removing the glasses. The resemblance of these twins is close enough to cause mistaken identity. (Exhibit B).
- d. At 12:25 p.m. an individual passed the relief guard [REDACTED] with a counterfeit badge containing her picture. (Exhibit C).
- e. At 2:00 p.m. the same individual passed regular guard [REDACTED] with the counterfeit badge.
- f. At 3:50 p.m. the individual referred to in paragraph "b" above passed Night Guard [REDACTED] with the badge of another individual. Neither person is known to this guard.

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
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6. It is concluded that:

- a. Penetration under the present badge identification system can be accomplished with comparative ease.
- b. Outstanding lost badges contribute to the possibility of such a penetration.

- c. The possibility of a change in the present badge identification system should be held in abeyance until all phases of this penetration survey are completed and an overall evaluation is made of the vulnerability of CIA to penetration.



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